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NOTES AND COMMENTS

1962l

perform services. The period of such liability must extend beyond
the year of receipt, but must not be in excess of three years. Those
taxpayers who cannot qualify under this statute may still be able to
defer reporting of prepaid unearned income by proving that there is
a reasonable correlation between the income deferred and future
expenses. Such a conclusion seems to be justified as the Supreme
Court in the principal case placed considerable reliance upon the
Automobile Club of Michigan case.
RoBERT

L. GuNN

Pleadings-Cross-Claim for Contribution
In Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc.,' plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries, joining A and B as alleged
joint tort-feasors. A filed a cross-claim against B setting up a plea
for contribution. B moved to strike the cross-claim. The trial court
allowed the motion. On appeal this was affirmed in a four to three
decision.'
The most obvious and severe consequence of this decision is to
preclude an original defendant in such an action from holding another
original defendant in to defend against his contribution claim should
plaintiff take a voluntary or suffer an involuntary nonsuit against him
at any time prior to judgment.' It thereby adds yet another complexity to an already intricate and still evolving pattern of rules in our
multiple party pleading practice.4
1254

N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).

Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Win-

borne, Justices Denny and Higgins concurred. Justice Bobbitt dissented,
joined by Justices Parker and Rodman. Subsequently, in Bass v. Lee, 255
N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961), the court reaffirmed this position with only

Justice Bobbitt dissenting.
'This consequence was frankly recognized by the majority opinion which
stated the question presented and answer in this form: "In an action against
two defendants, as joint tort-feasors, may one defendant set up a plea for
contribution against the co-defendant and thereby preclude dismissal of the
co-defendant during the trial and before judgment.... The answer is 'No."
254 N.C. at 691, 120 S.E.2d at 90.
' See Brandis & Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Partiesand Causes in North Carolina,34 N.C.L. REv. 405, 419-22,
425-29 (1956); BRAiNDIs, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the
Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245, 260-68 (1947); BRANDIS, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina,25 N.C.L. REv. 1
(1946).
In these articles the authors review the decisions of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in an effort to formulate the rules regarding multiple party pleading. From the cases discussed therein and more recent decisions of the court, the rules pertaining to cross-claim for contribution prior
to Greene appear to be as follows: (a) Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 1-240
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Bell v. Lacey,5 the case relied upon by the majority,' seems clearly
distinguishable.' Therein the objectionable cross-claim was for
(contribution statute) the rule was recognized that under G.S. § 1-222 a
defendant,' upon allegations of primary liability of his codefendant, could
cross-claim against the codefendant and demand judgment over against him
for the full amount recovered by plaintiff. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155
N.C. 18, 70 S.E. 1070 (1911). This rule was extended to allow joinder of
a third party upon allegations of -primary liability by the original defendant.
Bowman v. City of Greensboro, 190 N.C. 611, 130 S.E. 502 (1925). (b) G.S.
§ 1-240 gives the joint tort-feasors the substantive right of contribution from
each other and when sued alone, to have other joint tort-feasors made additional parties so that the contribution issue may be settled in one cause.
(c) The original defendant must allege facts sufficient to indicate that both
defendants are or may be liable to plaintiff and that plaintiff could claim
rights against the party added by timely assertions. Thus where he alleges
only that the negligence of another was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries, the cross-action against such other person will not be sustained.
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955).
(d) An additional party may not be joined for contribution when his negligence would be attributable to plaintiff and bar plaintiff's action. Evans v.
Johnson, 225 N.C. 238, 34 S.E.2d 73 (1945). (e) Where the original defendant has another joint tort-feasor joined for contribution, the joined
party may cross-claim against the original defendant for damages for personal injuries arising out of the same accident. Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C.
179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957). But where both tort-feasors are sued jointly by
plaintiff, neither may file a cross-claim for affirmative relief against his
codefendant, even though the cross-claimant has a cross-claim for contribution filed against him by the codefendant. Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104
S.E.2d 833 (1958).
(f) Where two defendants are sued together as joint
tort-feasors and one demurs successfully to the complaint and is dismissed
from the action prior to trial, he may be made an additional party defendant
by the remaining defendant under G.S. § 1-240. Canestrino v. Powell, 231
N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949). (g) Where two defendants are sued together as joint tort-feasors, and plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit as to one
during trial, he is ordered retained to answer to a cross-claim for contribution
filed by the other defendant. Smith v. Kappas, 218 N.C. 758, 12 S.E.2d 693
(1941), same case on rehearing, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941).
Greene overrules Smith without comment by the majority opinion, and
applies instead the rule of Bell which involved a cross-claim for affirmative
relief, not contribution. Greene also casts doubt upon the rule announced in
Canestrino. (See text infra.) Quaere: Considering the rule in Greene, what
results when plaintiff sues two defendants as joint tort-feasors, one demurs
successfully and plaintiff fails to amend or appeal but defendant files no
motion to dismiss the cause as to him, thus remaining a nominal party? May
remaining defendant maintain a cross-claim for contribution here? See Webb
v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948), where the court states
that such inaction by the plaintiff will work a dismissal of the successful
defendant, and Dudley v. Dudley, 250 N.C. 95, 107 S.E.2d 918 (1959), stating that defendant has a right to move for dismissal, which seems to suggest
that dismissal is not automatic in such a case.
It is doubtful if Greene will upset any of the rules formulated under G.S.
§ 1-222 dealing with indemnity or primary and secondary liability.
248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958).
'The court stated: "The question was definitely and clearly decided in
Bell v. Lacey. . . ." 254 N.C. at 691, 120 S.E.2d at 90.
This is the argument advanced by Justice Bobbitt in dissenting. He
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affirmative relief rather than for contribution. Cross-claiins for
affirmative relief have consistently been forbidden on the basis that
they present matter not "germane to plaintiff's cause, of action," 8 and
on the kindred basis, apparently seen as a corollary, that "an original defendant ... [cannot] compel the plaintiff to join issue with

a defendant he has not elected to sue."9 However justifiable under
code pleading practice these propositions may be in application to
cross-claims for affirmative relief,"0 they 'would appear inapplicable
to a cross-claim for contribution.
Cross-claims for contribution between original and impleaded
codefendants are of course widespread in practice and sanctioned by
the court.' There is no suggestion that they might be prohibited
by a requirement that they be germane to plaintiff's cause.'" To
the contrary, it is frequently pointed out that a defendant asserting
such a claim must recover, if at all, upon the liability of his 'code1
fendant to him and not on the strength'of .the plaintiff's c6ase. 3'
stated that Bell is not authoritr for the proposition that a defendant'may not
allege that his codefendant is a joint tort-feasor from whom he is entitled
to contribution. It is interesting to note that the only cross-claim for contribution in Bell was not objected to by the plaintiff or the codefendant, or
contested on appeal.
'Montgomery v. Blades, 217 N.C. 654, 656, 9 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1940).
Apparently the cross-claim for affirmative relief was pleaded in contemplation of Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957), where a
cross-claim for affirmative relief by a third party, joined by the original defendant for contribution, was allowed. Justice Bobbitt, in dissenting in
Greene, stated that the court in Bell was simply refusing to extend this rule
to a case where plaintiff sued both defendants.
' Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 705, 104 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1958). See also
Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956) ; Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943). Contra, Anx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007
(1947). This statute provides that upon joinder of the additional defendant,
the plaintiff shall amend his pleadings to assert against the third party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against him had,
he been originally joined.
"'Their applicability even here has not been consistently seen by the
court which has held that an additional defendant, joined by an original defendant upon a cross-claim for contribution, may cross-claim against the

original defendant for affirmative relief with no suggestion that such a cross-

claim is not germane to plaintiff's cause.

The cross-claim is held to be

justified, over the objection of the original defendant, because he is respon-

sible for the cross-claimant's presence in the case. Norris v. Johnson, 246
N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
I E.g., Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957) ; Godfrey v.
Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943); Mangum v.
185 S.E. 644 (1936).
Southern Ry., 210 N.C. 134, supra.
12 See cases cited note 11
13
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955);
Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
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Thus the lack of relation of the contribution claim to the plaintiff's
cause has consistently been emphasized rather than deplored where
contribution is sought between original and impleaded codefendants.
The objection that the practice would allow an original defendant
to compel a plaintiff to join issue with a defendant whom he has not
elected to sue appears equally inapplicable to the contribution crossclaim.14 There is nothing inherent in the assertion of such a crossclaim which would preclude a plaintiff from taking a voluntary nonsuit as to the other defendant at any time; nor which would compel
him to proceed to trial against such codefendant in the first instance;
nor, having done so, would compel him to introduce evidence, or
press for judgment; nor, having secured judgment, would compel
him to enforce it by execution. 5 Instead, upon nonsuit, either voluntary or involuntary, against such codefendant, the codefendant should
then become defendant as to the cross-claim for contribution alone
and retained in the action to meet the cross-claiming defendant's
proof of this separate claim.' 6

In Smith v. Kappas,17 decided in 1941 and neither discussed nor
"' No statute or decision in North Carolina states that plaintiff shall allege
a cause of action against a joint tort-feasor, joined for contribution by defendant; but quite the contrary, the principle is stated frequently that plaintiff may elect to sue all of the joint tort-feasors, or some of them and not
others. Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53
S.E.2d 269 (1949). The defendant, seeking to recover contribution, must
do so on the strength of his own pleading and proof, not that of plaintiff.
Jones v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 253 N.C. 482, 117 S.E.2d 496 (1960). Quacre:
What results, under Greene, when plaintiff sues one joint tort-feasor; the
latter moves to add another as party defendant under a claim for contribution; plaintiff then seeks to amend his complaint so as to state a cause of
action against both defendants? Should he be given leave to amend, and if
so, will the cross-claim for contribution, pleaded prior to the amendment, be
stricken under Greene? Under such procedure, if sustained, the plaintiff
who does not wish to have contribution issues litigated in his cause is afforded
a method to defeat the very purpose of G.S. § 1-240. Also, Greene may
create an incentive by plaintiffs to sue all joint tort-feasors, then take a nonsuit as to one on trial, again rendering G.S. § 1-240 ineffective to accomplish
the purpose for which it was intended, i.e., to have the contribution issue
settled in the same cause and avoid multiplicity of suits.
" This was indicated by the court in Mangum v. Southern Ry., 210 N.C.
134, 185 S.E. 644 (1936), wherein the court stated that the plaintiff cannot
be affected by the procedure of original defendants bringing in another party
as joint tort-feasor for contribution. Plaintiff has the right to prosecute his
suit to final decision in his own way.
" See Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 696, 120
S.E.2d 82, 93 (1961), wherein Justice Bobbitt suggests the procedure to be
followed in cases of the kind under discussion.
'218 N.C. 758, 12 S.E.2d 693 (1941). On rehearing of this case it was
found that the amended answer alleging the cross-claim for contribution
against the excused defendant was not filed until after the verdict in plain-
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cited in the majority opinion of Greene, the precise practice forbidden by Greene was directly sustained and successfully utilized to
hold an original codefendant in, after voluntary nonsuit, to meet a
cross-claim for contribution. Presumably, the trial bench and bar,
until Greene, lived by Smith.
Besides imposing a new rule in the Smith-Greene procedural
setting, Greene creates an anomaly when contrasted with another
closely related procedural situation. In Canestrino v. Powell,1 8 decided in 1949, plaintiff sued A and B; B successfully demurred to
the complaint, and when plaintiff failed to amend or appeal, B's
motion to dismiss as to him was sustained. A then cross-claimed
for contribution against B, and'moved to have him brought back
into the case. This motion was granted and the cross-claim sustained against B's demurrer terefo,19 despite the now final adjudication of B's non-liability to the plaintiff. Thus, considering Canestrino and Greene together, an original defendant may bring back
into the action for possible contribution an original codefendant who
has successfully established his non-liability to plaintiff by demurrer.
However, he cannot hold one in who, prior to any adjudication of
his liability to plaintiff, challenges directly, the cross-claim for
contribution.20
tiff's cause, nor did the remaining defendant request that the excused defendant be joined as a third party defendant under the contribution statute
until after the verdict. Upon this discovery, the court overruled defendant's
objection to plaintiff's voluntary nonsuit as to the codefendant. Smith v.
Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941).
18231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
See Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953), where the same procedure, as used in Canestrino, was used and
expressly approved on appeal. In a comparable situation, a Pennsylvania
court refused to dismiss the codefendant in the first instance, stating that it
would be idle for the court to approve a discontinuance that could not stand.
Its only effect would be to add to the procedural burdens of the defendant
and subject him to unreasonable delay and expense. Dice v. Marsolino, 14
Pa. D. & C.2d 457 (C.P. of Fayette County 1958).
"0The court in Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958),
stated the general rule that if an original defendant avails himself of the
provisions of the contribution statute, he cannot rely upon any liability of the
party, whom he has brought in, to the original plaintiff, but must recover, if
at all, upon the liability of such party to him. Thus the prerequisite for
contribution is not action by the plaintiff against the joint tort-feasor but
recovery by the plaintiff against the original defendant. Curiously enough
in both Bell and Greene where the court emphasizes the rights of the plaintiff and attempts to protect his cause of action from interference by defendant's pleadings, the objections came, not from the plaintiff, but from the
codefendant. With the exception of Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d
570 (1961), where both the plaintiff and the defendant to the cross-claim
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, 'The 'practical alternative to the :procedure forbidden in Greene.
is: a. separate action, which has distinct disadvantages. Often two.
jury .trials are.required where one would have sufficed. The claimant
for .cpnt-ribution is forced to run the risk of losing testimony by
death, lapse of memory, or removal of witnesses from the jurisdiction of the court: Further, these witnesses are often the same ones
who testified in.the original action and their inconvenience in being
summoned again should be considered. All this leads to a delay in
t erepovery, of! contribution, increases the work load of the courts,
multiplies the cost of litigation for the state as well as the parties
to .the issue, of contribution. .Also, the plaintiff may be compelled
to wait longer for his money since a joint tort-feasor, when sued
alone, may pay the.recovery to a trustee until the issue of contributioni settled in the separate action,21
This.and.other anomalies, present in our multiple party practice,
arise fromn the completely inadequate statutory basis upon which 'our
coprt has had to construct, step .by.step, our rules in this area. North
Qaroina.has no statute which prescribes the procedure for crossclaims.between original defendants," or with the impleading of new
defendants.23 Our contribution statute deals essentially with the
iu&stantive riiht to cbntribiition. fIt also contains, however, ambiguously worded procedural provisions which clearly contemplate
objected, in each case discussed and cited herein the plaintiff has raised no
objections to the cross-claim.
"N.C. GEN,: STAT. § 1-240 (f953).

-Cross-claims, where appropriate, are deemed sanctioned by N.C. GEN.
§ 1-222 (1953), which reads: "1. Judgment may be given for or against
one or, more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several
defendants; and it may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each
side, as between themselves. 2. It may grant to the defendant any affirma"
Since this statute does not
tive relief to.which he may be entitled ...
expressly state the nature of cross-claims allowable, the court has had to
define8 them; hence the rule against cross-claims for affirmative relief.
Impleading of new defendants, other than for contribution, e.g., for
indemnity, are likewise allowed under G.S. § 1-222. Here again the court
has applied the no affirmative relief rule in the absence of specific provisions
in the statute as to what may be the subject of a claim against an impleaded
defendant, but claims for indemnity are held not to involve claims for affirmative relief in this context. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C. 18, 70
S.E. 1070 (1911). This is founded on the basis that a claim for indemnity
relates to plaintiff's claim and is based upon an adjustment of it. Wright's
Clothing Store v. Ellis Stone & Co., 233 N .C. 126, 63 S.E.2d 118 (1951).
In the latter case the court recognized the principle that adjustment of plaintiff's claim by defendant's pleadings for indemnity against his codefendant
springs from equity, apart from the statutory right of contribution or indemnity among joint tort-feasors. This principle implies that the court
recognizes contribution as .being "an adjustment of plaintiff's claim."
STAT.

19621
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impleading new defendants for contribution,, but, not so clearly the
type of cross-claim between original defendants forbidden -by
Greene.2" Our court has thus been forced to-use statutes ill-adapted
to the necessities of multiple party litigation,25 so that the results of
specific decisions are frequently beyond criticism as interpretative of
the ill-suited statute perforce utilized.2 6 What is needed is a completely new set of statutes or court rules dealing specifically, and as
such, with cross-claims between original parties and with impleading
of new parties. Such statutes should define the extent to which each
may be utilized for asserting claims for affirmative relief, for contribution, or for indemnity."
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
approach the problem precisely in this direct manner and are couched
in clear language which would avoid the constructional difficulties
raised by our statutes.2
", N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 1-240 (1953), after providing that each joint tort-

feasor shall pay his proportionate share of the judgment, states: "[I]n the
event the judgment was obtained in an action arising out of a joint tort, and
only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made parties defendant,
those tort-feasors made parties defendant, and against whom judgment was

obtained, may, in an action therefor, enforce contribution from the other

joint tort-feasors; or at any time before judgment is obtained, the joint tortfeasors made parties defendant may, upon motion, have the other joint tortfeasors made parties defendant." The phrase "only one, or not all," as used
here, should apply to the procedural aspect of third party- practice and not
to the substantive right of contribution nor its enforcement when third party
practice is made unnecessary by plaintiff suing all of the joint tort-feasors.
Most jurisdictions, which allow contribution, have separated the substantive
rights and the procedural rules of enforcing it in their statutes. E.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1002, -1007 (1947), as amended, ARK. STAT. ANN: § 341002 (Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 263.15, 272.59-.61 (1957). See also
Northwest Motors, Inc. v. Creekmore, 229 Ark. 755, 318 S.W.2d 614 (1958) ;
Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956). But see Camden
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1199, 206 S.W.2d 699 (1947):.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-222, -240 (1953).
See note 4 supra.
See Brandis, A Plea For Adoption By North Carolina Of The Federal
Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245 (1947).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g) provides: "A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant." " FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(h) provides: "When the presence of parties other than those to
the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them
to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of
them can be obtained and their joinder will not deprive the court of jutisdiction of the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 14 sets out the procedure for third
party practice.
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Until such time as a new set of rules or statutes is adopted, however, the situation with respect to contribution pleading practice
appears to be as follows:
(1) where the plaintiff sues some but not all of the joint
tort-feasors, an original defendant may have the others joined
upon a plea for contribution against them ;29
(2) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
but one or more successfully demurs to the complaint and the
plaintiff fails to amend or appeal, the remaining defendants,
assuming they have adequate time, may have the defendants,
who were dismissed on demurrer, brought back into the action
upon a plea for contribution

;30

(3) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
even though plaintiff takes a voluntary, or suffers an involuntary nonsuit as to one of them, the remaining defendants cannot preclude his dismissal by pleading a cross-claim for contribution, but are relegated to a separate action in order to
settle the issue of contribution."1
HIRAM

A.

BERRY

Torts-Blasting-Basis of Liability: Negligence, Trespass or Absolute
Liability
No less than twenty-five years have elapsed since the problem
of damages caused by blasting operations has reached the North
Carolina Supreme Court. During this period, however, much litigation has arisen in this area of tort law elsewhere in the country,
and a reasonable prediction would be that the next case in North
Carolina will result in a new development in the law of this state.
The prime question facing the courts in this field concerns the
proper basis of liability for harm occasioned by the use of explosives
in blasting. Theoretically, there are three theories open to those
courts which remain uncommitted on this issue. They are: (1)
recovery should always depend upon proof of negligence or fault;
(2) the action should be one of trespass following the common law
concept of strict liability for trespass to land; and (3) the defendant
v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953); Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
"' Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961) ; Greene v. Charlotte
Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
9Norris
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